Riceburner
Well-known member
Much of the time it is.
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Boeing 737 Max 8
- Thread starter nobbie48
- Start date
Much of the time it is.
It all comes back to a fundamental flaw (either through a mistake or more likely intentionally trying to bury the problem) that the MCAS system was not a critical safety system and therefore did not need to be designed, instrumented and trained as such. Once it became just another unimportant cog in the wheel, it never got the attention required until it had killed hundreds of people. Who would design a system that relys on a single sensor and continues to fight all actions of the pilots until it physically runs out of adjustment room (and at that point ethiopia mcas was still trying to push the nose down, but a limit switch on the screw was not letting it). The updated idea is it only activates once and has a limit based on the pressure pilots can (or are?) applying to the stick which seems like a much more logical approach.
Again, all of the above is for a single system that some ahole buried to save their job or make a few bucks. How many other similar things are in the plane? Obviously Boeing doesn't care and the FAA either through underfunding, under braining or under monitoring is nothing more than a rubber stamp.
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Layman answer: yes they absolutely can **** up anything autonomous.
When it comes to anything automation, testing is a critical component. While it is very easy for automation to beat humans on consistency of success and lower rates of error, the flip side is that when software fucks up it fucks up reliably and the effects can be catastrophic.
I still trust software over human beings by a long shot though. Whatever code I write is going to retain all its flaws and strengths without randomly changing; it will consistently **** up and succeed predictably. Humans, however, are unreliable and emotional. There is literally nothing stopping any of us from having a bad day, jumping into a car, and taking out one's mental break down by running people over.
A pilot buddy flying for AC when asked about this anti stall device told me "I dont get it, in 30 yrs of flying jets I've never stalled an aircraft" , ha may have been cavalier but thought , its like a backup camera, very useful, if you back into a lot of things.
The problem was that with the changes to the aircraft, it was both more prone to stall and harder for a pilot to recover. With the increased engine offset, if you went up on engine power to try to regain speed, it would be very hard to impossible to get the nose down as the engine thrust would be pushing the nose up. MCAS attempted to get the nose going down prior to any intervention by the pilot.
How much of this was related to actual flying vs how much was related to trying to conform with parameters that were identical to the previous certified I don't know.
Much of this seems to be closely related to the minor variance game in building where a single family home becomes a six-storey doctors office through a series of small changes so they can avoid having to get the approvals that would normally be required.
As expected, shareholder lawsuit launched alleging Boeing put profits ahead of safety. $34 billion drop in market cap after crash.
Boeing sued by shareholders alleging company hid 737 MAX safety flaws - National | Globalnews.ca
How does such a lawsuit even make sense? If the lawsuit succeeds, the current shareholders pay out those that sold at a loss? The executive tosses in a few million in forfeited bonuses? Nothing even scratches the surface of $34 billion. I think the most reasonable solution is the executive are never allowed to be in a position of power in a publicly traded company. At least that solution may cause others to modify their behaviour.
Boeing sued by shareholders alleging company hid 737 MAX safety flaws - National | Globalnews.ca
How does such a lawsuit even make sense? If the lawsuit succeeds, the current shareholders pay out those that sold at a loss? The executive tosses in a few million in forfeited bonuses? Nothing even scratches the surface of $34 billion. I think the most reasonable solution is the executive are never allowed to be in a position of power in a publicly traded company. At least that solution may cause others to modify their behaviour.
Riceburner
Well-known member
Yeah. That's gonna happen.
Sounds like an anti-wheelie device.
I have invitations to two such lawsuits sitting on my desk where the claim is that management was negligent or possibly involved in criminal activities. Basically if the class action won, I would be compensated a bit for the losses I incurred at the time of sale.
The injured party is usually automatically enrolled and has to opt out if they want to pursue their own lawsuit. I get the impression that payouts are minuscule.
A lot of small aircraft use more typical methods. On many cessnas for example the stall warning is literally a "harmonica" type device that air gets sucked through from an inlet on the leading edge of the wing. As the air gets closer and closer to breaking off the surface of the wing (incipient stall) the airflow starts to become disrupted, and eventually starts to create a suction at the leading edge just before the stall actually occurs.
Here's what the inlet looks like:
They can be tested simply by, in short...sucking on them. This activates the horn in the cockpit. Simple demo here.
As the incipient stall gets closer (or further) from happening the stall horn can actually change (up and down) in pitch. So, when I was flaring for landing and aiming to "grease" things I'd listen to the stall horn and work the yoke in and out based on the horn until you were on the sweet spot on the runway and then pull it into a full on blare just before the wheels touch.
Other more complicated aircraft use a variety of systems, similar or far more complicated and involved, but the underlying warning (either physically activated as in the Cessna example above, or calculated based on sensor data) is the same. Simple systems like the Cessna example have simplicity going for them, whereas more complicated systems are...more complicated. Both have their advantages and disadvantages - the cessna system for example is easily disabled if the vent inlet becomes clogged (checking it is part of every preflight, but a birdstrike or debris (a balloon hit in midflight for example, however unlikely) can completely disable it. More complicated systems may also have their own avenues of failure, this thread case in point.
That argument falls apart if you equate it to, for example, cars. There's lots of safety related features on many modern day cars that remain options - blind spot notification, lane departure warning, adaptive cruise control, etc. Only recently have some of them become government mandated, IE backup cameras.
Should every technological safety feature available today be equipped on every single car?
Exactly.
The stupidity continues to leak. Boeing made MCAS four times stronger (whatever that means) after it was first submitted to FAA. FAA deemed that an unimportant change. Wtf. What was boeing doin with such huge changes in the system after it was initially submitted? Again, it looks like they were racing to get something in for approval and then trying to actually finish the design in parallel with the approvals.
Boeing reportedly made the flight-control system that mistakenly activated during 2 deadly crashes 4 times stronger while creating the 737 Max
Boeing reportedly made the flight-control system that mistakenly activated during 2 deadly crashes 4 times stronger while creating the 737 Max
Interesting article from an amateur pilot/software engineer.
How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer - IEEE Spectrum
How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer - IEEE Spectrum
https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/the-national-737-max-boeing-1.5107529
I have no doubt that software and training will resolve the issue but given the choice I wouldn't fly on a Max 8. It appears that a lot of other people think the same. It isn't just that Boeing made a mistake, it's that they deliberately worked the system to milk out more profit at the risk of lives.
I could possibly learn to trust the Max 8 but how do I learn to trust Boeing management?
I have no doubt that software and training will resolve the issue but given the choice I wouldn't fly on a Max 8. It appears that a lot of other people think the same. It isn't just that Boeing made a mistake, it's that they deliberately worked the system to milk out more profit at the risk of lives.
I could possibly learn to trust the Max 8 but how do I learn to trust Boeing management?
That has been my issue all along. When obviously the process has completely failed, what else was missed? Boeing is doing everything they can to keep the attention on MCAS and associated software update. What really needs to happen is a review of the design assuming that corrupt or incompetent people designed it. What else what that find? If that finds more deficiencies, what about the other Boeing models? That could be the end of the road for Boeing. Boeing will do everything possible to make sure such a review never publically takes place (in the interest of due diligence, they should damn well be having one done privately).
The article suggests financial compensation to lure back business. So, how low would an airfare have to be to get you back in a Boeing seat? What if your employer booked your next sales trip on a Max 8 while hinting of layoffs?
About 5000 on order. I wonder what the cancellation policy is for the airlines.
It's not a price thing and may not even be left up to individual passengers. It sounds like China/EU/Canada are all going to do their own reviews of the MCAS software update prior to allowing the Max planes to fly again. Any of those agencies could use this opportunity to expand the scope of the review. This is much more likely to happen in the EU to support Airbus or I have heard rumblings that China may have something in the works to open a window for a domestic plane manufacturer to flourish. Sadly, it will be a political decision almost entirely detached from engineering that determines the scope of any safety review.
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