Originally Posted by
Rob MacLennan
Speed, alone, can be the sole criteria for conviction, as set out on the very judgment that you cited. The statement by the appeals court is that it can't always be the sole point, but that it can be the sole point is never negated. This is where I say that you are incorrect, in reading the findings. The original quote that you posted was not in fact from the judge in question, but was an incorrect quotation made by the lawyer for the appellant, in an attempt to solidify his case, as quoted by the author of the judgement. Had you read further into the text of that case, you would have seen the ACTUAL quotation, as cited by the sitting judge.
If it's this quote from the judge, I did read it. "While evidence of speed standing by itself will not necessary lead to a finding of dangerous driving it may well do where as here the surrounding circumstances add a component to that speed that brings the driving up to the criminal level of dangerous driving."
Then the judge lists components. Speed was considered, but not in and of itself in absence of other components.
Here are some more, quoted from R. v Strange.
Speeding as A Factor in Dangerous Operation
24 Speeding can be an important part of the determination whether the conduct in question is sufficient to meet the modified objective standard. However, the speeding must be considered in all of the circumstances of the case in question. Mr. Bottos has relied upon the fact situations from a number of reported cases for his proposition that speeding in itself may not be sufficient to be a marked departure. Let me briefly set out the fact situations from those cases relied upon.
25 In R. v. Ingram (1981), 14 M.V.R. 60 (Sask. Q.B.) Cameron J. ordered a new trial where the evidence which convicted the accused was speed alone. There the speed was 160 k.p.h. on New Year’s day in a 100 k.p.h. maximum speed limit area outside of Regina for a 3 - 4 kilometre span. The accused was driving on a divided four lane highway with a grass median. His vehicle passed 4 to 5 vehicles and four access roads. There was no evidence that any vehicles altered course. The road was mainly clear, flat and straight. Cameron J. decided that the trial judge erred in believing himself bound by previous decision rather than applying the section to the circumstances before him.
26 In R. v. Rice reflex, (1983), 59 A.R. 351 (Alta. C.A.) Harradence J.A. writing for the Court allowed an appeal by an accused and entered an acquittal. There, the accused had been driving 60 to 70 m.p.h. in 43 m.p.h. speed zone. His vehicle collided with a vehicle executing a left turn across his lane of travel. This was an arterial highway leading out of Calgary where the speed limit is honoured in its breach. The accused had been drinking. Harradence J.A. said in the circumstances that “speed in itself would not support the conviction”: see para. 5.
27 In R. v. Strange (1985), 33 M.V.R. 211 (Sask. Q.B.) the accused had been found guilty by driving 155 k.p.h. on divided double lane highway in a 100 k.p.h. zone at 7:00 in the morning in daylight in good road conditions with light traffic. There was no evidence that other vehicles were there. Scheibel J. applied R. v. Ingram, supra and said that the matter was a factual one. Based upon the trial judge’s findings “speed alone” did not constitute dangerous driving: see para. 13.
28 In R. v. Frappier (1991) 98 Nfld 238 (Newfoundland S.C.T.D.) was a case where Barry J. decided that in the circumstances the Crown had not proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused’s vehicle collided with another vehicle which cut sharply in front of the accused’s vehicle and one of the occupants was injured requiring hospitalization. The trial judge found that the accused was traveling at a minimum speed of 140 k.p.h. in a 90 k.p.h. zone prior to entering the municipality; the trial judge found that the accused was proceeding at 50 to 60 m.p.h. in a 50 k.p.h. zone. The traffic was heavy.
29 In R. v. Morra (unreported October 9, 1992 Whealey J. Ont. Gen. Div.) the trial judge acquitted an accused who drove at speeds approaching 100 k.p.h. in city streets, ran through a red light, and a suggestion of swerving while being pursued. There was no evidence of the pedestrian or vehicular traffic that might reasonably be expected on the route.
30 In R. v. Allan Scott Smith (unreported 12 October 1993 Alta. Prov. Ct.), Her Honour Judge Van de Veen found an accused not guilty of dangerous driving where she had a doubt as to the exact amount of speed and the distance traveled by the accused. The driving took place while being chased by a police vehicle at 3:00 in the morning.
31 I have no difficulty that as a result of the factual findings made in each of the six cases relied upon by Mr. Bottos that the accused were properly acquitted. The principle, in my view, to be discerned from them is simply that speed is a factor that must be properly considered in view of all of the surrounding circumstances.
In other words, speed by itself is not sufficient for conviction, as per yet another criminal court judge plus the other judges quoted by this judge. I suppose those judges all got it wrong too?
This comes back to the 407 speeder. With so many prior upper and lower court rulings pointing out that speed by itself is not a sufficient indicator of criminally dangerous driving, on what basis could a cop stopping someone for extreme speeding in good weather and road conditions on an sparse or empty highway justify dangerous driving charges, as you suggested could be laid?
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